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Abstract. We study a simple model of tari¤ wars and trade deals
in which government revenue collection and disbursement uses resources. The
introduction of costly governments leads to lower non–cooperative tari¤s, the
possibility that a less costly government may win a tari¤war, and fully cooper-
ative trade deals where countries lower tari¤s but do not eliminate them, even
with lump–sum taxes and transfers.
1. Introduction
The standard theoretical model of non–cooperative tari¤ determination leads to the
familiar tari¤–war results (Johnson (1953)). Some authors, including Krugman (1993
pages 61 and 65 and his references), have argued that this standard theoretical result
may be inconsistent with observation — non–cooperative tari¤s appear to be set
more “cooperatively”, that is, lower. On the other hand, the traditional customs–
union literature presumes free trade within each customs union. Here the reality is
that tari¤s appear to be set less cooperatively, that is, higher. Even for members
of trade blocs “cooperation” appears to be limited in the sense that trade deals
while characterized by reciprocal reductions in tari¤s are not characterized by the
elimination of tari¤s on all goods and services. The GATT under the auspices of the
WTOfurnishesmany examples of suchtradearrangements. This short paper provides
a simple explanation for lower non–cooperative tari¤s and higher cooperative tari¤s.1
Clearly the operation of a government requires resources. So we begin with a
standard trade model and assume, for example, that hiring a customs o¢cer costs
resources. We show that this simple extension yields two results in the tari¤-war
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1The literature contains at least two classes of extensions to the traditional models that permit
positive tari¤s in cooperative trade deals. One is obtained by altering the traditional assumption
that benevolent governments act in the nation’s self–interest. Examples of papers that would fall
into this category are Grossman and Helpman (1994), Krugman (1993), and Ethier (1998). A
second explanation assumes that trade deals are not fully cooperative in the sense that it is assumed
countries cannot make binding international commitments, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (1997).
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model.2 1) The introduction of a costly government may lower that country’s non–
cooperative tari¤. The logic is that one of the bene…ts of a tari¤ is the revenue raised
and since an increase in the cost of government reduces the net revenue for a given
tari¤ it also reduces the optimal tari¤. Now consider two countries that di¤er in
their costs of government. 2) The country with the less costly government can win
a tari¤ war in the sense that it is better o¤ at the non–cooperative equilibrium than
at the laissez–faire free trade allocation. Here the idea is that the country with lower
costs will face a lower non–cooperative tari¤ the more costly is the opposing country’s
government (result 1); consequently the less costly country can win the tari¤ war.
We go on to explore an environment where fully cooperative trade deals are pos-
sible. We assume that the trade deal must be individually rational. Introducing the
possibility of cooperative trade deals into our model of costly governments leads to
two further results. Assume that governments are costly, but one government is more
costly than the other. Then we show 3) Tari¤s will not be zero in a fully cooperative
trade deal even with lump–sum taxes and transfers.3 In the case where the less costly
government wins the tari¤ war (result 2) the free trade allocation is not a potential
equilibrium trade deal because it is not individually rational for the less costly gov-
ernment. In such a case, absent revenue collection costs, trade deals would involve
free trade and a lump–sum transfer of resources between countries (a compensation
mechanism) to make it individually rational and Pareto e¢cient. But with costly
governments the use of a tari¤ in the less costly country becomes an e¢cient instru-
ment for transferring resources to that country. The idea is that raising resources in
the more costly country to compensate the less costly country may be less e¢cient
than permitting a positive distortionary tari¤ in the country with the lower revenue
collection costs. At free trade, for example, the marginal damage of using the tari¤
is zero. 4) Fully cooperative trade deals may require each country lowering its tar-
i¤s from the non–cooperative level without going to all the way to free trade. The
two strands to the logic are that reducing tari¤s from their non–cooperative levels is
exploiting gains from policy coordination, and not going all the way to zero tari¤s
follows from result 3.
To summarize, we show adding the assumption that the operation of governments
cost resources to a standard trade model may explain lower non–cooperative tari¤s
and higher cooperative tari¤s.
2. Framework and Results
Assume a two-country, two–good, general-equilibrium trade model, in which each
country is populated by a large number of identical price–taking individuals. We
normalize the population size in each country at unity. Let ti denote a tari¤ set by
country i and let ¿i be a lump–sum tax (or subsidy) used to balance each country’s
2To be precise, what we mean by tari¤ war is the standard one shot non–cooperative game of
tari¤ setting with complete information.
3A lump–sum tax is tax that can not be avoided to any extent through any action of an agent.
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government budget constraint. Denote the utility of each person in country i by
Ui(ti;tj;¿i): Write the government’s budget constraint in country i as Ri(ti;¿i;ci) = 0
where ci is a parameter measuring the costs of collecting and disbursing government
revenue. For example, Ri(ti;¿i;ci) might equal fi(ti)+¿i¡ci(jfi(ti)j+j¿ij); 0 < ci < 1;
where fi is increasing and concave, or fi(ti) +¿i ¡ ci(fi(ti)2 +¿2
i):
If each country picks its tari¤/tax instruments to maximize Ui subject to Ri,
taking as given the tax instruments of the other country, we obtain the standard
non–cooperative Nash equilibrium in which typically ti > 0 and ¿i < 0: Each country
tries to turn world prices in its favour and to collect su¢cient revenue from its tari¤ to
more than compensate for the damage the tari¤ does to its domestic economy. How
is this equilibrium a¤ected by the costs of collecting revenue? To …x ideas suppose
c1 = c > 0 and c2 = 0: Have individuals optimize and use the budget constraints in
each country to eliminate the taxes and thereby to write utility as V1(t1;t2;c) and
V2(t2;t1): Denote …rst and second partial derivatives by V k
i and V kl
i : The reaction
functions are de…ned implicitly by V 1
1 (t1;t2;c) = 0 and V 1
2 (t2;t1) = 0: The second-
order conditions for each country’s optimal tari¤ problem imply V 11
i < 0; i = 1;2:
Taking the total di¤erential of each reaction function separately and using V 11
i < 0
we …nd that the tari¤s are strategic complements (substitutes) if V 12
i > 0 (< 0):


























Stability of the equilibrium implies D > 0: Thus dt1=dc has the sign of V 13
1 ; where
V 13
1 is the marginal e¤ect of c on the net marginal bene…t to country 1 of raising
t1. One of the bene…ts of employing a tari¤ is the revenue collected. Since higher c
reduces the amount of revenue that a given tari¤ raises we assume that V 13
1 < 0:
Result 1. With V 13
1 < 0, country 1’s optimal tari¤ is decreasing in c:
The sign of dt2=dc depends not only on V 13
1 but also on V 12
2 : If V 13
1 < 0 and the
tari¤sare strategiccomplements (whichistrue insome trade models) then dt2=dc < 0:
Higher costs of revenue collection in country 1 weaken its ability to conduct a tari¤
war and this could induce country 2 to levy a lower tari¤ than it would otherwise. In
other words both non–cooperative tari¤s can be reduced by costly government.4
With c set equal to zero and the two countries roughly symmetric the tari¤ war
typically leaves them both worse o¤ than they would be with zero tari¤s — both
lose the tari¤ war.5 As we have observed, with c > 0; country 1’s incentive to choose
4This, of course, is not the only possibility. Below, we present an example with R1(t1;¿ 1;c) =
f1(t1) + ¿1 ¡ c(jf1(ti)j + j¿1j) where dt1=dc < 0 and dt2=dc = 0; that is, V 13
1 < 0 and V 12
2 = 0:
5Kennan and Riezman (1988) show that if one country is much larger than the other, this can
lead to the large country winning the trade war.Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government 4
a large tari¤ may be diminished and it may even be optimal for country 1 to set
t1 to zero, for a high enough value of c: If c is so high that the optimal level of
t1 = 0 and if, for example, V 12
i = 0 then if country 2 chooses to have a positive tari¤
(V2(t2 > 0;0) > V2(0;0)) it will win the tari¤ war. Here is the reasoning. First,
country 2 may choose to have a positive tari¤ even if c is large because with V 12
2 = 0
country 2’s optimal tari¤ is independent of c: Second, with V 12
1 = 0; country 1’s
optimal t1 = 0 is independent of t2: So the choice of t2 > 0 is enough to knowcountry
2 will be better o¤ with the tari¤ war.
Result 2. The less costly government can win a tari¤ war.
What are the characteristics of possible cooperative trade agreements satisfying
individual rationality, that is, when country 2’s utility in the tari¤ war is higher than








¸2(R1(t1;¿1;c) ¡ S) +¸3(R2(t2;¿2;0) + S);
where S is a transfer from country 1 to country 2:
It is impossible to provide a complete characterization of the conditions for Pareto
e¢ciency withcostly government without a complete model. Weprovidesuch amodel
in the following section, but here we show the possibilities by using the standard logic
of optimal taxation.
With no revenue collectioncosts (c = 0) any pointon the utility possibility frontier
is attainable by setting tari¤s to zero and then using a head tax in one country and a
head subsidy in the other, together with a transfer from the country with the tax to
the country withthe subsidy. If country 2 has “won” the tari¤ war (not because c > 0
but say because it is larger thancountry 1) then in any Pareto-improving and e¢cient
agreement country 1 would levy a head tax and use the revenue so obtained to make
a transfer to country 2; and country 2 would distribute the transfer to its citizens
through a head subsidy. To repeat, there would be free trade in any Pareto-e¢cient
agreement with c = 0.
When cis positive, however, e¢cient trade agreementslie along autilitypossibility
frontier, inside the costless government frontier except for one point. The point the
two utility possibility frontiers have incommonis the free trade point withno transfer
betweenthecounties (laissez-faire), for hereall taxes/tari¤s and hencecosts ofrevenue
collection are zero for any c. Figure 1 illustrates utility possibility frontiers with c = 0
and with c > 0.
6The cooperative trade deal here is also the equilibrium outcome of a non–cooperative game of
coalition formation (see Burbidge et al. (1997, proposition 1)).Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government 5
What constitutes optimal tax/tari¤ combinations along the frontier with c > 0?
Again, if country 2 has won the tari¤ war (because say c is su¢ciently large), the
relevant segment is that section of the frontier where country 2’s utility is higher
than it is at free trade. So long as costs of revenue collection are symmetric between
tari¤ and head tax revenue (as in the example revenue functions above) it can never
be e¢cient to have a nonzero tari¤ in country 1: The reason is that country 1’s
tari¤ distorts resource allocation whereas its head tax does not, so setting t1 = 0 is
optimal. Next, starting at the free trade point, note that there are two ways to raise
the welfare of country 2: (i) raise ¿1 above zero and use it to …nance a transfer S to
country 2; or (ii) raise the tari¤ rate in country 2; t2; above zero. In either case the
revenue accruing to country 2 would be distributed through the costless head subsidy
(¿2 < 0):7 Option (i) is somewhat costly because of collection costs; option (ii) is
somewhat ine¢cient because country 2’s tari¤ distorts prices. The choice between
(i) and (ii) is a standard optimal tax problem. If it is e¢cient to use both routes
simultaneously it must be that the nature of collectioncosts is such that the marginal
damage to utility per dollar of tax revenue raised is the same for both routes.
Assuming that the marginal collection cost of using ¿1 is positive and since the
marginal damage of increasing t2 at free trade is zero it must be that t2 > 0 in any
trade agreement with costly government. This is our third result.
Result 3. With governments that are costly but to di¤ering extents,
tari¤s are not zero in a fully cooperative trade deal, even with lump-sum
taxes and transfers.
Our last result is that one can …nd examples of initial tari¤-war Nash equilibria
and associated utility possibility frontiers, with costly government, such that any
point along the frontier that is a Pareto improvement (and therefore individually
rational) over the tari¤ war equilibrium has lower tari¤s for both countries than
tari¤s prevailing in the tari¤ war. We provide an example below.
Result 4. Fully cooperative trade deals may require each country low-
ering its tari¤s from the non–cooperative level without going to all the
way to free trade.
3. An Example
Our example is atwo-country, three-commodity simpli…cation of Grossmanand Help-
man (1994), extended toallowfor costly governments. The citizens of country i = 1;2
consume Xi
j of good j and have an aggregate endowment Ai of labour and a single
speci…c factor Ti which is essential in the production of good Xi: Utility is quasilinear













2; for i = 1;2 (3)
7Remember that we have set c2 = 0:Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government 6







We assume the technology for the only other good produced by country i = 1;2 has
the following particular Cobb–Douglas form.
Qi = (Li)
:5(Ti)
:5 for i = 1;2 (4)
All three goods are traded and we follow the literature in assuming that the trade
in good 0 is free. Then by assumption, the imports into country i of good j will
equal Xi
j for i 6= j:8 Consumers in country i maximize utility subject to the budget
constraint




i + (1 +ti)PjX
i
j for i = 1;2 and i 6= j; (5)
where ri and wi are the returns paid by competitive …rms to the …xed factor and to
labour. Trade takes place and prices are determined by supply and demand; each
factor is paid the value of its marginal product. For good 0 in each country we derive
Po = wi: Choosing good 0 to be the numeraire we have P0 = wi = 1: Assuming the
parameters are such that Xi











for i = 1;2 and i 6= j (6)
X
i
0 = riTi +Ai ¡ 2 ¡¿i for i = 1;2


















for i = 1;2











; for i = 1;2 and i 6= j:
8This is a further simpli…cation of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
9Countries are always denoted by the index i and goods by the index j: But when j = i in an
equation we will economize by replacing j by i from the outset.Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government 7
The …rst and third equations can be solved in closed form for Pi and Li and the
solutions can then be used in the second equation to solve for ri, all of which yields:
Li =
2+tj






for i 6= j
ri =
2+tj
2Ti(1+tj)for i 6= j
(7)
Note from (7) we must assume that ad valorem tari¤ rates are not so negative
that (1+tj) is negative. Equations (6) and (7) can then be used in (3) to write utility
















Using (6), the tari¤ revenue in country i is tiPjXi
j = ti
(1+ti), and thus the budget
constraints for the governments are:10
t2
1+t2 +¿2 = 0 for country 2
t1
1+t1 + ¿1 ¡ w(t1;¿1) = 0;








; c < 1; for country 1:
(8)
At the free trade (laissez–faire) allocation ti = 0; i = 1;2; and therefore each
country’s utility is Ui(0;0;0) ´ u
f
i; for i = 1;2: In a tari¤ war country i maximizes
Ui(ti;tj;¿i) subject to (8) by choosing (ti;¿i) taking (tj;¿j) as given. For country 2
the …rst–order condition with respect ¿2 implies that the Lagrange multiplier is unity
and then using this and the fact that t2 must be positive for positive consumptions








In appendix A we show that the dominant strategy tari¤ for country 1 is
te
1 =
¡3 ¡ 7c +
p
17 ¡ 6c ¡ 7c2
4(1 +c)
> 0 for 0 · c < 1=7
te
1 = 0 for c ¸ 1=7:
10Note that we can now give the cost of government a formal interpretation as an amount of good
0 or labour (numeraire) consumed by government operations.
11This is a dominant strategy because the utility maximizing choices of country i do not depend
on the choices of country j.Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government 8




17¡3)=4 > 0 and we derive result 1 from the previous section;
te
1 is a decreasing function of c. The logic of the result is simply that the use of tari¤
involves costs and bene…ts where one of the bene…ts the tari¤ revenue raised. An
increase in c reduces the revenue raised with a given tari¤ and thus it reduces the
equilibrium tari¤. At c = 1=7 the costs dominate the bene…ts and thus te
1 = 0:




















17 (see Appendix A). These then can be used
in (3) to determine the dominant strategy equilibrium utilities of Ue
i(ti;tj;¿e
i). As
above, we de…ne “winning a tari¤ war” as Ue
i > U
f
i : Note that the country with a less
costly government can win a tari¤ war. If c = 1=7 then te
1 = 0 — the free trade level




by the individual rationality of the choice te
2 > 0:
Since te
1 is a decreasing function of c and Ue
2 is a decreasing function of te
1; ue
2




















one …nds that country 2 wins the tari¤ war for c > 1=15:12
In Appendix B we characterize world Pareto e¢ciency for this model, that is, the
set of allocations from which it is not possible to make Pareto improvements.
A special case of our work in the appendix is e¢ciency when c = 0. It is char-
acterized by two exchange e¢ciency conditions—one for each pair of goods and two
overall e¢ciency conditions—one for each pair of goods. In terms of instruments and
denoting the costless-government choices by a superscript ¤ the necessary conditions
are ti = 0 for i = 1;2: The free-trade (laissez–faire) allocation above is, of course, a
Pareto e¢cient allocation with c = 0, but it is just one of a continuum. We show that




2) and has a constant





2 = 0; ¿¤
i < 0;
¿¤
j > 0; i 6= j; and there is an international transfer of resources from j to i.
In Appendix B we also show that when c > 0; Pareto e¢ciency involves free trade
ti = 0 for i = 1;2 only at the free trade allocation. Denoting choices with c > 0 by











2 < 0 and that there is a transfer of resources from 1 to 2 if ¿¤¤
1 > 0.
[Place Figure 1 here.]
Figure 1 illustrates the tari¤-war equilibria for 0 · c · 1=7; the utility possibility
frontier with c = 0 (which is a straight line), and the utility possibility frontier
(hereafter the UPF — AC) for c = 1=7: All lines are based on Ai = 3 and Ti = 1;
for i = 1;2: The right panel is a blow-up of the marked section in the left panel —
12To 10 decimal places it is 0:0671916407 which is slightly greater than 1=15:Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government 9





1 = 0; and an international transfer is not





1 > 0 and a transfer is made from country 1 to 2:
AXC0 is the outer envelope of DC0 and AF: The absolute value of the slope of AXC0
falls from a value of unity at the free-trade point, A; to 1¡ c at the crossover point,
X; and XC0 is a straight line. We now provide an explanation of these results.
Toraise U¤¤
2 from the free-trade allocation the distortionassociatedwithincreasing
t¤¤
2 from 0 is zero when evaluated at the free-trade allocation while the (marginal)
cost associated with increasing ¿¤¤
1 from 0 is c > 0: Thus initially the e¢cient solution
is to allow country 2 to use its tari¤ to increase its well–being. As we require larger
U¤¤
2 ; t¤¤




4 at which point
the distortion associated with increasing t¤¤
2 further would be larger than the cost
associated with using ¿¤¤
1 , that is, c: From point X onwards to C0 and C; ¿¤¤
1 is




4 : This continues to be true for all utility pro…les
with larger U¤¤
2 because cost is linear in ¿¤¤
1 : Note that increasing ¿¤¤
1 from 0 always
dominates increasing t¤¤
1 from 0 as both involve cost but the latter also distorts the
prices of goods.
We are now in a position to provide proofs of results 3 and 4 from the previous
section for this example.
Result 3. Tari¤s are not zero ina fully cooperative tradedeal, even with lump-sum
taxes and transfers.
Proof: If governments are costless or c = 0 then any cooperative trade deal has
t¤
2 = t¤
2 = 0. But with 1=15 < c · 1=7 any cooperative trade deal has t¤¤
2 > 0:
Result 4. Fully cooperative trade deals may require each country lowering its















for 1=15 < c · 1=7.
The intuition for these results is contained, of course, in the previous section.
4. Conclusions
The introduction of governments that use resources leads to lower non–cooperative
tari¤s, the possibility that a less costly government may win a tari¤ war, and fully
cooperative trade deals where countries lower tari¤s from their non-cooperative levels
but do not eliminate them, even with the lump–sum taxes and transfers.Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government 10
Appendix A
The problem of country 1 is
Max
t1;¿1;¸1
L = u1(t1;t2;¿1) +¸(t1=(1 + t1) + ¿1 ¡ w(t1;¿1)):








c=(1 +t1)2; t1 > 0
¡c=(1+ t1)2;¡1 < t1 < 0








c; ¿1 > 0
¡c; ¿1 < 0












































= ¡1 +¸(1+ c); ¿1 < 0:
Since c < 1 budget balance requires t1 R 0 if and only if ¿1 Q 0.





· 0 evaluated at t1 = 0 and






at t1 = 0; and ¸ = 1=(1 ¡ c) so that it does not pay to decrease t1 from 0. Using
the derivatives the latter holds for c 2 [0;1) and the former holds for c ¸ 1=7: Thus
te
1 = 0 and ¿e
1 = 0 for c ¸ 1=7:


































The …rst is not a solution as it implies t1 > 0 for c 2 (0;1): The second is not
because it implies t1 < ¡1 for c 2 (0;1) which implies an imaginary number for a
price (see (7)).





















(17¡ 6c¡ 7c2) ¡ 3¡ 7c
´








The second is not a solution as it implies t1 < 0 for c 2 [0;1): The …rst is a solution
for 0 · c < 1=7: For c ¸ 1=7 it is not a solution to this case because it implies t1 · 0
which contradicts our assumption here that t1 > 0:




(17¡ 6c¡ 7c2) ¡3 ¡ 7c
´
for c < 1=7 and te
1 = 1 for c ¸ 1=7: The dominant strategy ¿e
1 can then be derived
from te



















´ 0 · c < 1=7
0 0 1=7 · c < 1
Appendix B




F =U1(t1;t2;¿1) +¸1(U2(t2;t1;¿2) ¡ U2)+
¸2(t1=(1+ t1) +¿1 ¡ w(t1;¿1) ¡ S) +¸3(R2(t2;¿2) +S)
;
where S is a transfer from country 1 to 2 and R2(t2;¿2) = t2=(1 + t2) + ¿2: We are
interested in characterizing e¢cient allocations with U2(t2;t1;¿2) ¸ U
f
2: We assume








¡¸2 +¸3 = 0 (10)
or ¸1 = ¸2 = ¸3 ´ ¸. Using this, the …rst–order condition for t2 is
¡
1












Solving and simplifying yields ¸ = 1
3+t2¡2(1+t2)2:

































; t1 < 0
















= ¡1 +¸(1+ c); ¿1 < 0:




















¸ 0 evaluated at t1 = 0 and ¸ =
1
3+t2¡2(1+t2)2 so that it does
not pay to increase or decrease t1 from 0 and ¿1 from 0: It is immediate that the free
trade point ti = 0 and ¿i = 0for all i andthus ¸ = 1 is a particular e¢cient allocation,











are t2 = 0 so that ¸ = 1











Non–zero ¿i and S are used to achieve utility pro…les other than that at the free trade
allocation.
Thetari¤ war results imply that starting at the free-tradeequilibrium U2(t2;t1;¿2)
is increasing in t2 for 0 · t2 <
p
17¡3
4 : Since ¸ = 1
3+t2¡2(1+t2)2; ¸ is also increasing in





















t1 = 0 and for t2 such that 1 · ¸ = 1
3+t2¡2(1+t2)2 · 1




a solution for utility pro…les with U
f

















(9+8c); the latter from R2(
p
(9+8c)¡3
4 ;¿2) = 0:
If 1





> 0 so this solution applies only to allocations

















= 0 or ¸ =
1
1+c < 1 which yields t2 < 0 by
¸ =
1










> 0 evaluated at t1 = 0,
¸ = 1
1+c and c > 0. These imply that S < 0 and thus ¿2 > 0 by budget balance:
Therefore this allocation has U2(t2;t1;¿2) < U
f
2 = U2(0;0;0): Since we are interested
in the region where U2(t2;t1;¿2) ¸ U
f
2, ¿1 < 0 does not apply.





= 0 or ¸ = 1
1¡c: Given ¸ = 1





3+t2¡2(1+t2)2 or t2 =
p
(9+8c)¡3


































and thus the ¿1 > 0 solution applies only




























= 0. This in turn implies ¸ = (1 +
t1)
3+2t1





> 0 which implies













= 0, which implies
¸ = (1 +t1) 3+2t1





< 0 which implies ¿1 < 0 and
then ¸ = 1=(1 ¡ c); which contradicts ¸ < 1=(1 + c): Thus in any e¢cient solution
t1 = 1:
To summarize, for allocations where













1 = 0; S¤¤ = ¿¤¤
1 = 0; t¤¤
2 given by U2(t¤¤
2 ;0;¡t¤¤
2 =(1 +t¤¤
2 )) = U2,
¿¤¤
2 = ¡t¤¤
2 =(1 + t¤¤
2 ) and ¸ = 1
3+t¤¤
2 ¡2(1+t¤¤
2 )2: This corresponds to the curved line
segment in Figure 1. For allocations where












itis e¢cient tohave t¤¤




















1 given by ¿¤¤
1 ¡ w(0;¿¤¤
1 ) ¡ S¤¤ = 0: This
corresponds to the straight line segment in Figure 1.Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government 14
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